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The Courts have no juriidiction over the Chief Executive of a State, to compel
or restrain the performance of any official duty, whether executive or ministerial.
BI filed a bill in equity, to compel A, the Governor of the State, to deliver to
complainant a certificate (if election to membership in Congress, and to enjoin the
issuance of c.ne to another applicant. The Constitution of Tennessee required the
Governor to perform certain duties, and such others as might be devolved upon
him by .,tatute. Among the latter provided by the Code, was that of issuing a
commission to each person elected to Congress. Facts were alleged tending to
show that B mhad
been du!y declared elected, and that A had signed and sealed a
comnission to B, but pending its delivery, had changed his mind, and was about
to i-sue a commi.sion to C, a contestant. On motion to dismiss, held, that the
Court had no jurisdiction over the Governor to grant the relief prayed for.

APPEAL from Chancery Court of Davidson County.

A bill was filed in the Chancery Court at Nashville, Tennessee, by Creed F. Batcs, complainant, against Robert L.
Taylor, Governor of the State, to compel the latter to deliver
a certificate of election to the complainant and to prevent the
issuance of a certificate to H. Clay Evans, another applicant.
Complainant alleged in substance, that he was elected to
membership in the Fifty-first Congress of the United States,
in the Third Congressional District of Tennessee, on the sixth
day of November, 1888; that the fact of his election was duly
ascertained by the Governor and Secretary of State, who by
law constituted a board to canvass the returns; that, thereupon,
in further compliance with the law, a certificate, showing the
fact'of his election, was made out, signed by the Governor,
attested by the Secretary of State, and sealed with the great
seal of the State; that, after all this, the Governor refused to
deliver said certificate to the complainant, and claimed that one
H. Clay Evans was elected to said office and entitled to receive
a certificate of election instead of complainant; and that the
Governor was about to issue a certificate to said Evans, though
the latter was not elected and the Secretary of State would not
join the Governor in such certificate.
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Complainant further alleged that when the said board acted,
and the certificate reciting his election was signed, attested and
sealed, the board's power was exhausted and complainant's
rights became fixed and his title to the office complete; that
the board could not subsequently reconsider its action and
declare another person elected; that in no event had the Governor a right to reconsider the matter himself, and issue a certificate to Evans, without the concurrence of the Secretary of
State; that the issuance of a certificate to Evans would, in
view of foregoing facts, be a usurpation of authority on the
part of the Governor to the great and irreparable injury of
complainant.
The prayer of the bill was that the Governor be enjoined
from issuing a certificate to Evans, and that he be compelled
to deliver the one already signed, attested and sealed to complainant.
The Governor appeared by counsel and moved the Court
to dismiss the billi. For want of equity on the face of the bill.
2. For want of jurisdiction in the Court.
3. Because it is unfit for a court of equity.
The Chancellor sustained the motion and dismissed the bill.
Complainant appealed.
Vertrees & Vertrees, Hill & Grassbery and M1arks & farks,
for complainant.
A. S. Colyar, Demoss & M1'oline and S.
spondent.

Matson, for re-

CALDWELL, J., Feb. 16, 1889, (after stating the foregoing
facts): The main question debated at the bar, and that which is
conclusive of the case, is one of jurisdiction.
The Constitution ordains that the Governor of the State
shall perform certain duties therein prescribed, and such others
* as may from time to time be devolved upon him by act of the
Legislature-Art. III. Among the duties so devolved upon
him by statute is that of issuing a commission or certificate of
election to each person elected representative to Congress.
Code (M. and V.) sections 1094 and 1146. The issuance of
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such commission or certificate, whether called a ministerial
or an executive duty, is an official action, whose performance
can be neither coerced nor restrained by the courts.
An attempt on the part of the courts to control his action
under the statute would be an invasion by one department of
the Government of the rights of another department, and, for
that reason, a violation of sections i and 2 of Article II of
the Constitution, which are in the following language:
"Sec. i. The powers of the Government shall be divided into three distinct departments-the legislative, executive and judicial.
Sec. 2. No person or persons belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except in cases
herein directed or permitted."

It is well settled by all the authorities that mandamus will
not lie to compel the Governor of a State to perform duties
of a purely executive or political nature, involving the exercise of official judgment and discretion, but the decisions are
wide apart as to the power of the courts to compel him to discharge those duties, which as other official duties are called
ministerial.
The courts of Ohio, Alabama, California, Maryland and
North Carolina, are together in holding that the Governor may
be required by mandamus to perform duties of the latter class;
while the courts of Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey and Rhode Island, have uniformly held the contrtry, upon the grounds that the powers of
Government in the States are distributed among three departments, which under the organic law are to be and remain independent of each other: High on Extraordinary Legal Remedies, sections I18, 119, 12o and 121. This author cites the
cases from the different States mentioned. We have examined
them, and also a very instructive case from Michigan: Suttlzciland v. The Goz'crnor (IS 7 4 ), 29 Mich. 321, which is in accord with those fiom the States last mentioned, and we are
fully persuaded not only that the weight of authority, but also
the weight of reason, is against the power of the courts to
coerce the Chief Executive of a State into the performance of
any official duty.
This Court has heretofore put itself in line with those courts
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denying the existence of such power: Turnpike Company v.
Brown (1875), 8 Baxt. (Tenn.), 49 o . In that case, the Turnpike Company sought, by mandamus, to compel Governor
Brown to issue certain bonds of the State which, it claimed,
the Legislature had directed to be issued 'by the Governor.
The relief was refused upon two grounds: first, because the
company had not shown itself entitled to. the bonds; and,
secondly, because the Court had no jurisdiction to control the
action of the Governor with respect thereto.
In combatting the idea that the Governor might be compelled to perform a ministerial duty, the Court, speaking
through Judge McFARLAND, said: * * * "The Governor
holds but one office, that is the office of Chief Executive.
Any duty which he performs undet authority of law is an executive duty, otherwise we would have him acting in separate
and distinct capacities. In some respects he would be the
Chief Executive, an independent department of the Government ; as to others he would be a mere ministerial officer, subject to the mandate of any Judge of the State; and we must
assume alzo that the Judge would have the power to imprison
the Governor if he refused to obey his order, for if the Court
has this jurisdiction, the power to enforce the judgment must
follow." See 8 Baxt., 493. The jurisdiction was denied,
upon the ground that the courts had no right to interfere with
the head of another department of the Government in the discharge of a duty by law devolved upon him.
But it is now argued that so much of the opinion in that
case as relates to the question of jurisdiction was obiterdictum,
because the question decided in an earlier part of the opinion
was conclusive of the case. This cannot be so. Both questions were fairly raised by the record, and the fact that the
question of jurisdiction was discussed last, does not make it
any the less entitled to the force of an adjudication.
It is further contended that this Court disregarded and overruled that part of that decision by taking jurisdiction of a
mandamus proceeding against Governor Marks, in the late case
of the State e.r re. v. Board of Inspectors (i 88o), 6 Lea (Tenn.),
12. The question of jurisdiction was expressly reserved in that
case, for the reason, as stated in the opinion, that the Governor
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had in his answer declared his willingness to submit to the
direction of the Court.
Whether jurisdiction of the person in such a case can properly be confirmed in that way, is not material in this case. It
does not arise here. It did arise there, and the Court exercised
all the power of jurisdiction-whether rightfully or wrongfully,
can neither affect the present case nor impair in any degree the
authority of the Brown case. Jurisdiction -was taken in Missouri: R. R. v. The Govicrnor (1856), 23 Mo. 353, upon a
similar expression from the Governor, while in Michigan it
was refused: Suthcrlandv. Thre Governor, 29 Mich. 321.
We have no hesitation in holding that the courts have no
jurisdiction to compel the Governor to deliver to complainant
the certificate claimed by him, no more than have they the
power to restrain him from issuing a certificate to the other
applicant. If the Governor cannot be compelled by mandamus to deliver a certificate of election to one person, it follows that he cannot be restrained by injunction from delivering it to another person ; for the nature of the act to be performed by him is precisely the same in one case as in the other,
and the same considerations operate to defeat the jurisdiction
of the courts in both instances.
But, conceding for the sake of the argument that the Governor could not, in the first instance, have been compelled to
give the certificate to complainant or prevented from giving it
to Evans, the very able and learned counsel of complainant
go further and insist, with great force and plausibility, that the
Chief Executive of a State may be enjoined from doing an
unlawful thing; that, under the facts disclosed in the bill, the
act sought to be restrained is unlawful, and that, being unlawful, its performance may be prevented by injunction.
The essence of these facts is that the Governor and Secretary of State together reached the conclusion from the returns
that complainant had been elected, and, thereupon, prepared,
signed, attested and sealed a certificate showing that fact, and
that before the delivery of that certificate the Governor changed
his mind, decided that Evans was elected, and without the
concurrence of the Secretary of State, was about to issue a
certificate to Evans, when this bill was filed.
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The statute devolving upon the Governor the duty of issuing
a commission or certificate of election necessarily confers upon
him the right of determining when and how that duty, within
the law, must be performed; and when he comes to do the
thing required, he must be allowed to do it.according to his
own judgment as to the meaning of the law and on his own
sense of official responsibility under his oath. In other words,
it is his province to construe the statute for himself, and to determine for himself when he has complied with all its requirements, and when there yet remains something for him to dowhether he may act alone under a given state of facts, or must
act in conjunction with another; and so long as he acts in
good faith and with an honest purpose, discharging his duty
under the law, his action cannot appropriately be characterized
as unlawful. In such case the courts have no power to substitute their construction or judgment for his, and tell him
when to stop or when to go on.
If they have such authority as to one statute imposing an
obligation -upon him, they have it as to all such statutes, and
with respect to all requirements made of him by the Constitution as well.
Such a view would put the responsibility of the Governor's
office upon the judiciary, and virtually make him subject to
the direction of the courts in every action he might takethereby working a substantial destruction of one department
of the State Government, and a usurpation of its functions by
another, contrary to the genius, spirit and letter of the Constitution.
If the Governor act corruptly he is amenable to the Legislature ; and if, in an honest endeavor to discharge his duty, he
mistake the law and prejudice individual rights, the injured
person may in proper cases restrain the one benefited from
using his advantage.
Let us illustrate the connection and at the same time the independence, the checks and balances, of the three departments
of government: The Legislature should never pass nor the
Governor approve an unconstitutional law; yet, because the
duty of enacting laws rests upon the one, and that of approving or disapproving them upon the other, the courts cannot
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restrain the former from passing nor the latter from approving
a statute obviously unconstitutional. While acting in their
own appropriate spheres the Legislature and the Governor
must be allowed to judge of the constitutionality of the law
for themselves. After that the judiciary acts, and, at the suit
of some interested party, annuls the law because violative of
the Constitution. Thus the integrity and independence of each
department are preserved, conflict between them is prevented,
and the injurious application of an unconstitutional law is
averted.
We do not think the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States stand in the way of the conclusion we have
reached, though the Federal courts have, in several instances,
taken jurisdiction of proceedings against the Governors of certain States and put them under restraint by injunction.
In Davis v. Gray (1872), 16 Vall. (83 U. S.) 203, Gov. Davis,
of Texas, was enjoined from wrongfully issuing patents to land,
which had previously been granted to other persons. The
Governor of. Louisiana was restrained from issuing bonds
under an unconstitutional act, in the case of Board of Liquidation v. J11Comb (1875), 92 U. S. 53!. In another case, the
Governor of Missouri and others acting with him were by injunction prevented, or restrained for a time, from selling certain
property to enforce statutory mortgage liens claimed by the
State, the claim by the adverse party being that the liens had
been satisfied: Ralston v. .Missouri Fund Commissioners (I886),
120 U. S.39!.
The Davis case was cited approvingly in Allen v. Railroad
(1884), 114U.S. 3I, and In Re AyCrs(1887), 123 Id. 5o6;
while it was questioned and limited in Cunninglhai v. lacon
& Brunswick Railroad(1883), 109 Id. 453.
Now, the most that can be said of these cases is, that they
show the jurisdiction of the Federal courts to restrain the Governor of a State from doing a wrongful act to the injury of
individual rights. It is not even intimated in any one of them
that the State courts have any such jurisdiction. There is a
wide difference between the relation of the Federal judiciary
and the State judiciary to the Governor of the State, and
because of that difference, the Federal decisions referred to are
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not at all in point in this case. A State's judiciary sustains the
same relation to its Governor that the Federal judiciary does
to the President of the United States; and as a State court, by
reason of that relation, has no jurisdiction to coerce or restrain
the Governor with respect to his official duties, so the Federal
courts, for the same reason, have no power to interfere with
the official acts of the President It was so held in the case of
the State of .[ississippi v. Johnson (I 866), 4 Wall. (71 U. S.) 499.
In that case, the State of Mississippi, as party complainant,
sought by injunction to restrain President Johnson from the
execution of the reconstruction acts of Congress, upon the
allegation that they were unconstitutional. The Court held
that it had no jurisdiction either to compel the President to
execute constitutional laws, or to restrain his action under
unconstitutional legislation.
The reasoning of the Court is embraced in the following
quotation from the opinion of Chief Justice CHASE, who spoke
for the whole Court:
"It will hardly be contended that Congress (the courts?) can interpose, in any
case, to restrain the enactment of an unconstitutional law; and yet, how can the right
of judicial interposition to prevent such an enactment, when the purpose is evident
and the execution of that purpose certain, be distinguished, in principle, from the
right to such interposition against the execution of such a law by the President?
The Congress is the legislative department of the Government; the President is
the executive department. Neither can be restrained in its action by the judicial
department; though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject
to its cognizance. The impropriety of such inference will be clearly seen upon
consideration of its possible consequences.
"Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed for allowed. If the President
refuses obedience it is needless to say the Court is without power to enforce the process. If, on the other hand, the President complies with the order of the Court and
refuses to execute the acts of Congress, is it not clear that a collision may occur
between the Executive and Legislative Departments of the Government? May
not the House of Representatives impeach the President for such refusal ? And
in that case could this Court interfere in behalf of the President, thus endangered
by compliance with its mandate, and restrain by injunction the Senate of the United
States from sitting as a Court of impeachment ? Would the strange spectacle be
offered to the public world of an attempt by this Court to arrest proceedings in that
Court ?
"The questions answer themselves :" 4 Wall. 500 and 501.

The case of ilfarbiny v. Jfadison (1803), I Cranch (5U. S.)
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137, is not in conflict, and could not be, for the President was
not a party.
It may be of some interest, and not inappropriate at this
point to note the fact that an unseemly conflict was narrowly
cscaped in that case, though the case was not against the
President himself, but only against a member of his Cabinet.
Chicf Justice GREEN, of New Jersey, says: "We have Mr.
Jefferson's authority for saying that if the Supreme Court had
granted a mandamus in the case of .Azarbzuy v. Madison, he
should have regarded it as trenching on his appropriate sphere
of duty; that he had instructed lr. Madison not to deliver the
commission, and that he was prepared, as President of the
United States, to maintain his own construction of the Constitution with all the powers of the Government, against any
control that might be attempted by the judiciary, in effecting
what he regarded as the rightful powers of the Executive and
Senate within their peculiar departments :" The State v. The
Govcrnor(I856), 25 N.J.L. 351.
The question of jurisdiction being conclusive, it has not been
deemcd important to decide whether, under the peculiar language of the statute, the delivering of the certificate made out
for the complainant was necessary to invest him with a title to
the office; nor whether, after the signing, attesting and sealing
of that certificate, the Governor could rightfully reconsider his
action and, without concurrence of the Secretary of State, issue
to Evans a certificate.
But if the law be, as claimed in the bill and in the argument,
that what was done with respect to the first certificate gave
complainant a complete title and exhausted the power of the
Governor, and that lie could properly act only in conjunction
with the Secretary of State, then, of course, a subsequent
certificate by the Governor to Evans would neither confer
title upon him nor impair the title of complainant; and there
would be no sufficient reason for seeking the aid of a court
of equity.
Let the decree be affirmed, and the bill dismissed at the cost
of complainant.
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This case is of interest as furnishing
one more authority on themuch mooted
question of the jurisdiction of the State
courts over the Governor, to compel by
mandamus the performance of a ministerial act.
The general principle is of course
well settled, that no public functionary
of whatever grade can be compelled by
the courts to perform his executive or
political duties. It is quite equally well
settled that, generally speaking, public
officers can be required, through judicial process, to perform duties purely
ministerial. A ministerial duty, as contra-distinguished from those of the executive or political class, is understood
to be one in which nothing is left to
discretion, but which the person upon a
given state of facts performs in a prescribed manner in obedience to law:
State of MAississippi v. Johnson (1867),
4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 498; Flournoy v.
City of Jeffersonville (r861), 17 Ind.
169, 174.
In 1839, a case came before the Supreme Court of Arkansas on petition for
mandamus, commanding the Governor
to issue a commission to the petitioner
as a commissioner of public buildings
duly elected. The Governor declined
to issue the commission, alleging as a
ground for refusal that, when the election was held, there was no law in force
authorizing the Legislature to hold an
election for the office. The Court, without considering the merits of the case,
refused the mandamus on the ground
that under our system of government,
the legislative, executive and judicial
departments are independent of one
another, and that no control, direction
or review of the exercise of the functions of one department was contemplated as existing in another. The issuing of commissions was required of
the Governor by a constitutional provision. It was a political duty which was
not enforceable by judicial mandate.

Nor could the fact that the act to be
performed was merely of a ministerial
or perfunctory nature, break down the
barrier of separation between the departments which had been established.
Said the Court in concluding its opinion,
speaking by LACY, J.: "The analysis
of his duties, then, clearly proves that
he is in no way amenable to the judiciary for the manner in which he shall
exercise or discharge these duties. His
responsibility rests with the people and
with the Legislature. If he does an
unconstitutional act, the jud!iciary can
annul it, and thereby assert and maintain the vested rights of the citizen.
The writ asked for, however, does not
proceed upon the ground that the Governor has done any illegal or unconstitutional act, but that he has refused to
perform a legal or constitutional duty.
In the first case, the Court certainly has
jurisdiction; and in the last, they certainly have not. The Court can no
more interfere with executive discretion, than the Legislature or Executive
can with judicial discretion. The Constitution marks the boundaries between
the respective powers of the several
departments, and to obliterate its limits
would produce such a conflict of jurisdiction as would inevitably destroy our
whole political fabric; and with it, the
principles of civil liberty itself. It
would be an express violation of the
Constitution, which declares upon its
face, that there shall be three separate
and independent departments of government, and that no person or persons,
being of one of these departments, shall
exercise any power belonging to either
of the others:" Hawkins v. Governor
(1839), I Ark. 570.
In 1856, an application for mandamus was made in Ohio, upon the relation of a banking association, to
compel the Governor of the State to
issue his proclamation, as required by
statute, announcing that the relator was
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entitled to commence and conduct the
business of banking. The Court refused the mandamus on other grounds,
but declared that ordinarily mandamus
would lie against the Governor to
compel the performance of his ministerial acts, such as the one before the
Court. The grounds of the decision
were, that, although by the Constitution
the Governor was invested with important political powers, is the exercise of
which his dcterniinations were conclusive, yet that there was nothing in the
nature of the chief executive office of
the State which prevented the performance of duties merely ministerial being
required of the Governor. The duty
in question was merely ministerial, was
requircd by statute, and might have
been devolved upon any other officer of
the State. It was not necessarily connected with the supreme executive
power of the State. Such being the
case, the Governor was amenable to law
and could be required to do the specific act the same as any other public
officer: State v. Chase (I856), 5 Ohio
St. 52S. This ruling was in the line of
an utterance of the same Court as early
as IS32, in State ex rel. Loomis v. _1offi1/, 5 Ohio 358 (which was a quo
warrantoproceeding to try the title to
a judgeship), to the effect that mandamus will lie against the Governor to
compel him to issue a commission to a
properly certified party, since "the
Governor is no less amenable to law
than the most humble citizen."
The principle enunciated in the Ohio
case in 1856, would of itself be quite
reconcilable with that of the earlier case
in Arkansas, if there were nothing to
follow by way of development of the
principles of those cases. The two
cases taken together, might be understood as establishing that the performance of an act required of the Governor by constitutional provision could
notbe compelled by mandamus, while

the duty of performance of an act
purely ministerial in its nature, if placed
upon the Governor by the Legislature,
might be enforced by such a proceeding. As matter of fact, however, later
cases go much further on each side of
the question, so that a harmony of decisions upon the above ground or upon
any other is quite impossible.
The following are the decisions affirmning the lower in the courts to
tandamusthe Governor:
State v. Chase, supra.
Tennessee & Coosa R. R. Co. v.
Mloore (x86o), 36 Ala. 371.
A sum of money had been loaned to
a railroad company by act of the Legislature which required the Governor to
draw his warrant in favor of the company upon certain terms being complied
with, which it was shown had been
done. The Court directed the issue of
the writ.
Cotten v. Ellis (i86O), 7 Jones (N.
C.) 545.
Upon the relation of the AdjutantGeneral of North Carolina, the Court
directed the writ to issue to compel the
Governor to draw his warrant on the
State Treasurer for salary earned.
State v. .KirZkoood (1862), 14 Iowa
162.
The application was for a mandamus
to compel the Governor to issue a certificate for certain lands. The petitioner had not complied with the conditions of the law and it was refused.
The jurisdiction was, however, assumed to exist, to compel the Governor
to perform ministerial duties.
iiddleton- v. Low (1866), 30 Cal.
596.
The Court declined to issue a mandamus upon the facts, but conceded
that it would issue to compel the Governor to sign a patent for lands, upon
the relator complying with the necessary provisions of the law.
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Afagruder v. Swann (1866), 25 Md.
173The application here was for a mandamns, to compel the Governor to issue
a commission to the petitioner, who was
elected judge, as appeared by the certificate of the clerk of the county. The
duty of issuing commissions was imposed upon the Governor by Article
IV, section 149, of the State Constitution of 1864, which provided that "all
elections of judges and other officers
provided for by this Constitution, State's
attorneys excepted, shall be certified,
and the returns made by the clerks of
the respective counties to the Governor,
who shall issue commissions to the different persons for the offices to which
they shall have been respectively elected." The mandamus was allowed on
the ground that, although the duty enjoined on the Governor was contained
in the Constitution, it was not in that
portion of the instrument relating to
executive duties. Being purely a ministerial duty, it could therefore be required of the Governor or of any lower
officer.
Har.pending v. Zaight (1870), 39
Cal. x89.
The Court directed the writ to issue,
requiring the Governor to cause to be
authenticated as a statute, a certain bill
which had passed both houses of the
Legislature and had not been returned
with his veto. Mr. Justice TEMPLE
dissented, on the ground that the duty
to be performed was devolved upon the
Governor by the Constitution, and that
as to such duties, he was absolutely independent of control by the judiciary.
[Contra, in Illinois: Peolle v. Yates,
infra].
Groomev.Gwinn (1875),43 Md. 573.
The Court, by mandamus, directed
the Governor to issue a commission and
administer the oath of office to the Attorney-General, who had been duly returned elected.

Chumasero v. Potts (1875), 2 Mont.
242.

Mandamus was issued against a canvassing board, consisting of the Secretary, Marhal and Governor of the
State, to compel a canvass of all the
votes of the territory after a certain election, to determine the question of the
removal of the seat of territorial government.
Z re Cunningham (1875), 14 Kan.
416.
The Supreme Court of Kansas raised
no objection to the issuing of the writ
on jurisdictional grounds, but refused
to compel the Governor to issue a patent for lands, because certain conditions had not been complied with by
the petitioner.
Gray v. State (1880), 72 Ind. 567.
Mandamus was allowed against the
Governor, Attorney-General, Treasurer,
and Secretary of State, directing them
to redeem certain bonds of the State,
for whose redemption a specific fund
had been provided. It was held, that
other persons being joined with the
Governor, upon whom, with him, was
laid the duty to perform the act, it was
not in any sense executive, but in the
purest sense ministerial. There had
been at least two previous decisions in
Indiana, in which the courts issued the
These
writ against the Governor.
were: Governor v. Nelson (1855), 6
Ind. 496, where the Governor was coinpelled to issue a commission to the
clerk-of a circuit court; and Baker v.
Kirk (1870), 33 Ind. 517, where the
issuing of a commission to a plaintiff
as the director of a State prison, was
directed. In neither of these cases,
however, was the right of the Court to
issue the mandamus against the Governor disputed.
The following are the decisions denying the power in the courts to issue the
writ :
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Hawkins v. Governor, supra; Low
v. Towns (1850), 8 Ga. 360.
The Court declined to compel the
Governor to issue a commission to Low
as clerk of court, a statute providing
that such officers should be commissioned by the Governor. The justices
saw no reason why the chief executive
should not be complelled by mandamus
to perform a ministerial act, but refused
the writ for political reasons.
The
Governor, it was said, has certain other
duties to perform, which the needs of
the people require to be done. A refusal on the part of the Governor to
comply with the order of court, would
sulject him to imprisonment, in the
event of which the person chosen by
the people to act as Governor could not
exercise his necessary functions.
ln re Dennell (IS51), 32 Me. 508.
The Court declined to issue a mandamus against the Governor and council to compel them to declare the election of the petitioner to the office of
county commissioner. The duty required of them was s.atutory.
State v. Governor (iS56), 25 N. j.
L. 331.
Mandamus was refused to compel the
Governor to issue a commission to the
applicant as surrogate of the county of
Passaic. A constitutional provision required the Governor to issue commissions to officers of the State requiring
to be commissioned. The refusal of the
writ was put on the ground, inter alia,
that the Court hid no power to award a
mandamus, either to compel the execution of any duty enjoined on the Executive by the Constitution, er to direct the
manner of its performance.
Po.Plev. Bissell (1857), 19 Ill. 229.
The Court declined to compel the
Governor to issue to the petitioner certain new bonds of the State, which a
statute required should be issued in
payment of arrears of interest on old
bonds.
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People v. Ya/es (1863), 40 Ill. 126.
The Court, upon facts quite identicil
with those in IZairein. v. zaight,
supaa, decided directly contrary to the
California court.
ilfawan v. Smith (1865),8 R. I. 192.
The Court refused to isue the writ
against the Governor to compel him to
convene a court mar.ial for the trial of
charges preferred against the petitioner.
State v. Governor(iS67), 39 Mo. 3 S8.
The Supreme Court of Missouri decided that it had no jurisdiction over
the Governor to compel him to issue to
relator a commission as a county justice. The duty of issuing such commissions was placed upon the Governor
by constitutional provision, and, as a
political duty, was not under the control of the courts. The same Court at
an earlier.period (1856), had issued a
writ of mandamus against the Governor,
but the latter had adm'tted the jurisdiction by expressing his willingness to
perform the duties devolved upon him,
if the Court should so direct.
PaceAc Railroadv. Governor23 Mo.
353; State v. lVarmouth (1870), 22
La. An. 1.
A statute required the Governor to
sign and deliver to the State Auditor,
for issuing to parties entitled, bonds due
contractors for public works. The
Court declined to compel the Governor
to sign and deliver certain bonds
claimed by the petitioner.
Rice v. Austin (1872), 19 Minn. 1O3.
The Court refused the writ asked for
to compel the Governor to execute and
deliver to petitioner a deed of certain
lands claimed under the provisions of a
statute. The act was conceded to be
a ministerial act. In an earlier case in
the State, Chamberlainv. Si&ey (186o),
4 Minn. 309, it was admitted obiter,
that the Governor could be compelled
to perform his ministerial duties. In
Rice v. Austin, however, the dictum in
Chamberlain v. Sibley was repudiated
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(without reference to the case however), and the independence of the executive department declared to depend
as much upon the non-interference of
the judiciary in the ministerial functions of his office as in those strictly
executive in their nature.
Sutherlandv. Governor (1874), 29
Mich. 320.
The application to the Court was for
an order requiring the Governor to show
cause why he did not issue a certificate,
showing that the Portage Lake and
Lake Superior ship canal and harbor
had been constructed in conformity to
an act of Congress, which required the
Governor to issue his certificate of the
fact. Mr. Justice COOLEY for the Court,
in refusing the writ, took very broad
grounds against the jurisdiction, declaring that all duties imposed upon
the Governor as such, whether by constitution or by statute, were official, and
in the matter of their performance, he
was not liable to mandamus.
Turnpike Companyv. Brown (1875),
8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 490.
The facts of this case were as recited
in the principal case, the Court refusing
the mandamus.
In Appeal of Hartranfiet al. (I877),
85 Pa. 433, it was held by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that
the Governor and certain other State
officers were not liable to attachment
for disobeying a subpoena to testify before a grand jury as to matters of fact
in connection with certain riots at Pittsburgh, with which facts they became
conversant in performing the duties of
their respective offices. In the course
of the opinion, the Court, referring to
State v. Warmouth, supra, approves of
the doctrine that the Governor is not
subject to mandamus, to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty.
State v. Drew (1879), 17 Fla. 67.
The mandamus asked for was to
have the Governor compelled to issue

to the relator a commission as United
States Representative, after the Board
of Canvassers had declared him elected.
The laws of Florida required the Governor to make out, sign, cause to be
sealed and transmit a certificate of election. The writ was refused, Mr. Justice WESTcoTr dissenting.
People v. Cullom (1881), 1 oo 111.472.
The Court of last resort in Illinois
declined to mandamus the Governor to
call an election as required by law.
SUMMARY.
It will thus be seen that the courts of
nine States and Territories (to wit, Alabama, California, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Montana, North Carolina, and Ohio), affirm the jurisdiction;
while the courts of eleven States (to
wit, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and
Pennsylvania), deny it.
In the difference of opinion that has
existed among the State courts, resort
has been had to the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States,
on the subject of mandamus to executive officers of the Federal Government. The Federal courts, as shown in
the principal case, have several times
enjoined State Governors. These decisions are, however, scarcely relevant
to the question of the jurisdiction of the
State courts over the executive department of the State. The Federal Government sprang not from the States,
but from the people of the United
States. If the Governor of a State refuses to perform a ministerial duty, lawfully required of him, and the Federal
courts have jurisdiction on other
grounds, there is perhaps no reason
why they should decline jurisdiction by
mandamus or injunction, merely because his status gua the State, happened to be that of chief executive
officer. There is apparently nothing in
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systems, requiring the Federal courts
to regard as independent of their control, the executive officers of a State.
The Federal courts are bound to respect the separation of functions of the
legislative, executive and judicial departments established by the Constitution of the United States, and to recognize the independence of each, but this
obligation does not require the same
recognition of the similar departments
established by the State. It was decided in AKentucy v. Dennison (i86o),
24 How. (65 U. S.) 66, that Congress
had no power to impose duties upon
State officers, and that such duties attempted to be imposed the Federal
court could not enrorce. But as indicated above, a ministerial duty plainly
and lawfully required of a State officer,
is clearly within the cognizance of the
Federal courts.
The only relevant analogy in the
Federal legislaion is the relation of the
Federal courts to the President. It
has never h~een decided that the President is or is not subjcct to mandamus
to compel him to perform ministerial
duties.
Afarbury v. Mladison (1803), 1
Cranch (5 U. S.) 137, is the leading
case on mandamus in the United
Courts. The action was brought to
compel President Jefferson's Secretary
of State, Mr. Madison, to delivertothe
plaintiffs their commissions as justices
of the peace in the District of Columbia. They had been appointed and
confirmed during the administration of
President Adams, and their commissions had been signed and sealed. The
Court decided that the Supreme Court
of the United States had no original
jurisdiction to consider the case, and
discharged the rule which had been
granted.
Chief Justice MARSHALL,
however, in the course of his opinion,
declared in favor of the granting of the

writ in general against public officers,
for the performance of such ministerial
duties as were required of Mr. Madison. The principles there stated have
been recognized and followed, as applied to similar cases. Some of the expressions used have furnished the basis
for the doctrine of those courts that
sustain the issuing of the writ against
the Governor. For example, it was
said, inter alia, by the Court: "It is
not by the office of the person to whom
the writ is directed, but the nature of
the thing to be done, that the propriety
or impropriety of issuing a mandamus
is to be determined:" p. 170.
There are other expressions, indicating that there was no purpose to express an opinion that the President,
equally with his cabinet officers, was
amenable to the writ. And, indeed, it
was conceded by counsel in the case,
that the President was not personally
subject to mandamus; Charles Lee, attorney for the plaintiffs, who had been
Attorney-General, saying, p. 149: "I
declare it to be my opinion, grounded
on a comprehensive view of the subject, that the President is not amenable
to any court of judicature for the exercise of his high functions, but is responsible only in the mode provided in
the Constitution."
A number of other cases have confirmed the jurisdiction of the courts to
compel the performance of the purely
ministerial duties of cabinet and other
similar officers. Among these are Kendall v. United States (1838), 12 Pet.
(37 U. S.) 524; UnitedStates v. Schurz
(188o), 102 U. S. 378; Butterworthv.
United States (1884), 112 Id. 50;
United States ex rel. Afiller v. Black
(1888), 128 Id. 4o.
In the State of Miusssipiv.Johnson
(1867), 4 Wall. (71 U. S.) 475, it was
sought to enjoin President Johnson from
carrying out the Reconstruction Acts.
The Court ruled, upon the only point
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necessary to a decision, that the President cannot be restrained by injunction
from carrying into effect an act of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional. It
refused (p. 49S), to express an opinion
whether, in any case, the President
might be required by the proce-s of
the Court to perform a purely ministerial act under a positive law. In the
briefs of counsel in this case are presented very fully and forcibly the arguments that exist in favor of and against
the jurisdiction of the courts over the
chief executive officer of the United
States.
In the course of the opinion of the
Court in Aendall v. The United States
(1838), 12 Pet. (37 U. S.) p. 6xo, it
was said: "The executive power is
vested in a President; and as far as his
powers are derived from the Constitution he is beyond the reach of any other
department, except in the mode prescribed by the Constitution, through the
impeaching power."
In the judgment of the writer, the
weight of the argument is with the view
taken by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in the principal case, that mandamus will not lie against the Governor. The courts that take jurisdtiction,
do so on the general principle that when
one man shows himself entitled to a
specific thing in the form of property or
office and he is deprived of it by
another, the courts will provide the
means for his obtaining it, following the
maxim that there is no wrong without a
remedy. If this were the only possible
aspect of the question, there would be
no reason for the court withho'ding its
arm in any case where the failure 'to
perform a ministerial duty were established to its satisfaction, whether the
defendant happened to be the Governor
of the State, or an officer of less dignity.
It is quite impossible, however, to
ignore the fact that the courts exercise

their functions as part of a governmental
system embodied in a written constitution, which has as its fundamental
principle of organization the complete
independence of the executive and judicial as well as legislative departments.
If the judicial department may, in any
case, direct or control the performance
of a duty by another department, the
barrier of separation is at once broken
down.
It is no answer to say that in matters
purely ministerial, the Governor does
not exercise executive functions, and
therefore is subject to judicial control as
to such acts. Said TALIAFERRO, J., in
State v. WMrnouth, sipra: ",We
think this doctrine ohjectionable in this,
that it accords to the judiciary the
large discretion of determining the
character of all the acts to be performed Iy the chief executive officer, as
being merely ministerial or otherwise.
This would infringe the right of the
executive to use discret.on in determining the same question. He must be
presumed to have this discretion, and
the right of deciding what acts his duties require him to perform, otherwise
his functions would be trammeled, and
the execulive branch of the Government made subservient in an important
feature to the judiciary."
If it be said that to give the governor
the power of final determination, as to
the perfirmance of acts required of him,
would be to acknowledge an authority
higher than the law, the answer is at
hand, that the law from which the
judges derive their power to act is the
constitution, and no supremacy or control can be asserted or maintained by
them that is not recognized by that instrument.
The best answer to the position, that
if the governor is free from control by
the courts, parties having rights will in
many cases be left without remedy, is
given by CoOLEY, J., in Sutherland v.
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Governor (1874), 29 Mich., at page
330: "Practically, there are a great
many such cases, but, theoretically, there
are none at all. All wrongs, certainly,
are not redressed by the judicial department. A party may I.edeprived of a
right l'y a -. rong verdict, or an erroneous tulng of a judge, and though the
error may be manifest to all others than
those who are to decide upen his riohts,
he will he without redress. A person
lawfully choien to the legislature may
have his seat given by the house to
another, and be thus wronged without
remedy. A just claim against the State
may he rejected by the board of auditors, and neither the governor nor the
courts can give relief. A convicted
person may conclusively demonstrate
his innocence to the governor, and still
be denied a pardon. In which one of
these cases could the denial of redress
by the proper tribunal, constitute any
ground f,,r interference by any other
authority? The law must leave the
final decision upon every claim and
every controversy somewhere, and when
that decision has been made, it must he
accepted as conect. The preumption
is just as conclusive in favor of executive action as in favor of judicial. The
party applying for action, which under
the constitution and laws, depends on
the executive discretion, or is to be determined by the executive judgment, if
he fails to obtain it, has sought the
proper remedy and must submit to the
decision."
And it is not easy to see why the
courts shall have any more power of
control over the action of the governor
in any given case, if the duty required
of him happens to be statutory, than if
imposed by the constitution. So long
as it is required of him as governor, that
is, as the functionary occupying the
chief executive office, in performing it,
it would seem, lie may claim the officer's immunity from control.

Of course it is not contended that the
governor, as a private citizen, is free
from liability to judicial process. It is
admitted hy all the courts that for his
private acts, or fir any acts not properly
within the scope of his office, he is, as
any other citizen, amenable to process.
The logic of the argument relieving
the governor from judicial process, requires that where, by the constitution
of the State, the executive department
is specifically vested in other officers
with him, they, as well as lie, are free
from control or direction at the hands
of the courts. Accordingly, in Houston
Tap .- 1?razonia A'. A'. Co. v. Randolph
(S5 9 ), 24 Tex. 317, the Court fur this
reason refused to compel the Treasurer
of the State to pay certain bonds, the
warrants for whose payment were duly
presented, in strict compliance with
law.
So, in County v. Dike (1874), 20
Minn. 363, the Constitution of Minnesota providing that the executive department should consist of a governor,
lieutenant-governor, secretary of state,
auditor, treasurer, and attorney-general,
chosen by the electors of the State, it
was held that a mandamus would not
lie against the State Treasurer and Secretary of State.
It will be observed that the Constitution of the United States vests the executive power solely in the President. It
is, therefore, quite in keeping with the
above view, that mandamus proceedings should be entertainied against Cabinet officers in certain cases, since they
are not, by the organic law, vested with
any executive power, and therefore made
part of an independent branch of the
Government.
The judgmert ii the principal case
has been criticised as not being warranted by the facts. It has been urged
that the case really presented the question of whether the Governor, after
signing the commission, which entitled
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the relator to it as a vested right, could
lawfully withhold it from him or issue a
commission to another. Counsel for
the relator contended with much force
that the Governor's power of acting
being functes officio, he could not preserve an immunity from judicial cognizance of his subsequent acts in the
matter, merely because he honestly believed that, as Governor, he still had the
power to act by awarding the commission to another. If, as Governor, he
had no further power to act, it was
forcibly urged he could not obtain that
power merely by supposing he had it.
It was therefore deemed by the relator
essential that the Court should pass upon
the question of his title. This the Court
declined to do, resting its decision solely
upon the ground that no jurisdiction
existed to control the Governor's acts in
the premises. It seems to the annotator
obvious that the Court upon its view of
the constitutional question involved, was
right in declining to enter into any
other discussion. The Court either had
or had not jurisdiction over the Gov-

ernor by mandamus and injunction in
his official capacity. The fact that the
Governor assumed to act, when his
power was exhausted, could not give
jurisdiction to the courts, if the law of
the land denied it. The fact that practically an irreparable wrong might be
perpetrated by the Governor upon the
relator by withholding his commission,
could not vest autl.ority in the courts to
redress the wrong, if they had not that
power given them under the system of
government of which both the executive
and the judiciary were parts.
A. H. WINTERSTEEN.
Philadelphia.

[In the case of Riley v. Hovry, decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana,
May 18, x889, the court ordered a
mandate against the Governor, compelling him to issue a commission to
Riley as a trustee, elected by the Legislature, for the Institution for the Blind.
The question agitated, however, was
merely wheiher the Legislature could
J. B. U.
elect to the office.]
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When an insolvent debtor transfers substantially all his property to a part of his
creditors, the form of the transfer or transfers will be disregarded, and a statute
forbidding preferences in assignments for the benefit of creditors will be held applicable in equity to authorize proceedings of an equal distribution of the assets
among all the creditors.
The mere name of the particular instruments used will be disregarded in equity,
and the court will consider whether the financially embarrassed debtor has, in
good faith, and without a present purpose of discontinuing business, compromised
his liabilities by sale or transfer of his property.
The attempt to obtain an illegal preference over other creditors, will not deprive
the creditor making such an attempt, of his equal share in the estate of the insolvent debtor.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Northern District of Illinois.
This was an appeal from a decree declaring two conveyances
of real property in Illinois, a bill of sale of numerous pictures,
a judgment by confession in one of the courts of that State
pursuant to a warrant of attorney given for that purpose, and
certain transfers of property accompanying that warrant, to be
void as against the appellee, Cotzhausen, a judgment creditor
of Alexander White, Jr. It was assigned for error that the
decree was not supported by the evidence. Besides controverting this position, the appellee contended that the conveyances,
judgment by confession, and transfers, were illegal and void
under the provisions of the Act of the General Assembly of
Illinois, in force July I, 1877, concerning voluntary assignments for the benefit of creditors. I Starr & C. St. 1303 (see
the quotations in the opinion of the Court, infra).
The record contained a large amount of testimony, oral and
written, but the principal facts were as follows: Alexander
White, Sr., died intestate in the year 1872; his wife, Ann White,
four daughters, Margaret, Elsie, Mary S., and Annie, and two
sons, Alexander and James B., surviving him. Each of the
children, except James, was of full age when the father died.
At the request of the mother, and with the assent of his sisters,
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Alexander White, Jr., qualified as administrator, and in that
capacity received personal assets of considerable value. With
their approval, if not by their express direction, he undertook
the management of the real estate of which his father died
possessed; making improvements, collecting rents, paying taxes
and causing repairs to be made. He received realty in exchange
for stock in a manufacturing company, and in part exchange
for the homestead, taking the title in his own name. After the
death of the father, the widow and children remained together
as one household, the expenses of the family, and of each
member of it, being met with money furnished by Alexander
White, Jr., out of funds he received from time to time, and
deposited in bank tQ his credit as administrator. But no
regular account was kept, showing the amount paid to or for
individual members of the family. In 1878, it was determined
by the widow and children to have an assignment of dower and
a partition of the real property, and proceedings to that end
were instituted in the Circuit Court of Cook county, Illinois.
Before the close of that year, or in the spring or summer of
1879, having failed to obtain from the administrator a satisfactory account of the condition of the estate, they consulted an
attorney, who, upon investigation, ascertained (using here the
words of appellants' counsel) that Alexander White, Jr., "had
lost the entire personal estate, and had nothing, except his
interest as an heir in certain of the real estate, with which to
make good his losses." It appeared, as is further stated, that
he had mortgaged some of the real property, the title to which
had been taken in his name; had anticipated rents on other
property; had exchanged lands for stock in a heating. and
ventilating company; had allowed taxes to accumulate; and
had, besides, induced some members of the family to guaranty
his notes to a large amount. Upon these disclosures being
made, the property was put under the immediate charge of the
younger son, and the attorney with whom the mother and
sisters had advised, was directed to collect the amount due
from Alexander White, Jr. Thereupon a friendly accounting
was had, which resulted in a report by him to the Probate
Court, on the 18th of July, 1879, of his acts and doings as
administrator during the whole period from the date of his
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appointment, April 9, 1872, to July 21, 1879. The report
admits a balance due from him as administrator of $89,646.o5,
and charges him, "by virtue of the statute" (Rev. St. Ill. 1874,
c. 3, § 113), with $40, 123.8o, being interest on that sum from
January 21, 1875, to July 21, 1879, at the rate of IO per cent.

perannum; in all, the sum of $12 9 ,76 9 .85. He does not seem
to have asserted any claim whatever for his services as administrator, or for managing the real property. That report was
approved by the Probate Court, which made an order, July 22,
1879, directing the said sum of $129,769.85 to be distributed
and paid by the administrator as follows: To the widow,
$43,256.61, and to each of the other children, $14,418.87. It
should be stated in this connection, that on the I6th of July,
1879, two days before the report to the Probate Court, the
proceedings in the partition suit were brought to a conclusion
by a decree assigning dower to the widow, and setting off
specific parcels of land to Margaret and Alexander, respectively, and other parcels to the remaining heirs jointly. On the
same day, Alexander White, Jr., executed two conveyancesone to his sisters (except Margaret), and his brother James,
jointly, for part of the lands assigned to him by the decree
of partition, and the other to his sister Margaret, for the
remaining part; the former deed reciting a consideration of
$56,859.20, which is about the aggregate of the several amounts
subsequently directed to be paid by the administrator to his
brother and sisters (except Margaret), while the latter deed
recited a consideration of $14,214.80, which is about the sum
directed to be paid to his sister Margaret. Two days later,
July 18, 1879, Alexander White, Jr., executed to his mother,
brother, and sisters (except Margaret), a bill of sale of his
*interest in certain pictures which had come to his hands as
administrator; and three days thereafter, July 21, 1879, he
executed to his mother a note, accompanied by a warrant of
attorney to confess judgment, and by a conveyance and transfer of certain real and personal property as collateral security
for the note. Subsequently, September 4, 1879, pursuant to
that warrant of attorney, judgment was entered against Alexander White, Jr., for $43,807-50, in the Circuit Court of Cook
county. It is not claimed that any money was paid to him in
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these transactions, and it is admitted that the sole consideration
for his transfers of property to the members of his family was
his alleged indebtedness to them, respectively.
By the final decree in these consolidated causes, it was adjudged that the two conveyances of July i6, 1879, the bill of
sale of July 18, 1879, and the judgment by confession of September 4, i879, and the transfers accompanying the warrant of
attorney of July 21, 1879, were made without adequate consideration, and with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud the
appellee, Cotzhausen, who was found by the decree to be a
creditor of Alexander White, Jr., in the sum of $27,842.22, the
aggregate principal and interest of four several judgments
obtained by him against White, in I881 and 1882. The debts
for which these judgments were rendered, originated in the
early part of 1878, in a purchase from Cotzhausen of nearly all
the stock of the American Oleograph Company, whose principal place of business was Milwaukee, Wisconsin. In this
purchase Alexander White, Jr., was interested. It is to be
inferred from the evidence that the principal object he had in
making it, was to transfer the office of the company to one of
the buildings owned by the family in Chicago, and to start or
establish his younger brother in business. His mother and
sisters were evidently aware of his purchase, and approved the
object for which it was made. It may be here stated that
Margaret White died unmarried and intestate before the decree
in this cause was entered, but the fact'of her death was not previously entered of record. The parties to the present appeal,
however, by written stipulation filed in this cause, waived all
objections they might otherwise make by reason of that fact.
It was further stipulated that the appellants were the only
heirs at law of Margaret White. The appellee waived all objections to the present appeal on the ground that Alexander
White, Jr., did not join in it.
Ira W Buell and C. M. Osborn, for appellants.
Enoch Totten and John C. Spooner, for appellee.
Mr. Justice HARIAN, January 28, 1889. (After stating the
facts as above):
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Too much stress is laid by the appellee upon the fact that
Alexander White, Jr., after qualifying as administrator, was
authorized by his mother and sisters to control, in his discretion, both the real and personal estate, of which his father died
possessed. The granting of such authority cannot be held to
:have created any lien in favor of his creditors upon their
respective interests. Nor can it be said that they surrendered
their right to demand from him an accounting, in respect to
his management of the property. Upon such accounting, he
might become indebted to them; and, to the extent that he
was justly so indebted, they would be his creditors, with the
same right that other unsecured creditors had to obtain sat isfaction of their claims. The mode adopted by them to that
end, with full knowledge as we'1, of his financial condition, as
of the fact that he was being pressed by Cotzhausen, was, to
take property on account of their respective claims. After he
had executed the conveyances, bill of sale, warrant of attorney,
and transfers, to which reference has been made, he was left
without anything that could be reached by Cotzhausen. So
completely was he stripped by these transactions of all property, that, subsequently, when his deposition was taken, he
admitted that he owned nothing, except the clothing he wore.
He recognized his hopelessly insolvent condition, and formed
the purpose of yielding to creditors the dominion of his entire
estate; and it is too plain to admit of dispute, that in executing
to his mother, sisters, and brother, the conveyances, bill of sale,
warrant of attorney, and transfers in question, his intention was
to give them, and their intention was to obtain, a preference
over all other creditors. What was done, was in execution of
a scheme for the appropriation of his entire estate by his family,
to the exclusion of other creditors, thereby avoiding the effect
of a formal assignment
The first question, therefore, to be considered is, whether the
several writings executed by Alexander White, Jr., for the
purpose of effecting that result, may be regarded as, in legal
effect, one instrument, designed to evade or defeat the provisions of the statute of Illinois, known as the "Voluntary Assignment Act," in force July I, 1,877 [Laws of 1877, page 116; I
Starr & C. St. 1303]. The first section of that statute provides-
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. i. That, in all cases cf voluntary assignments hereafter made for the benefit of
creditor or creditors, the debtor or debtors shall annex to such assignment an
inventory, under oath or affirmation, of his, her, or their estate, real and personal,
according to the best of his, her, or their knowledge; and also a list of his, her, or
their creditors, their residence and place of business, if known, and the amount of
their respective demands; but such inventnry shall not be conclusive as to the
amount of the debtor's estate, but such assignment shall vest in the assignee or
assignees, the title to any other property, not exempt by law, belonging to the
debtor or debtors at the time of making the assignment, and comprehended within
the general terms of the same. Everv assignment shall be duly acknowledged
and recorded in the county where the person or persons making the same reside,
or where the busine.zs in respect of which the same is made, has been carried on;
and in case said assignment shall embrace lands, or any interest therein, then the
same shall also be recorded in the coanty or counties in which said land may be
situated.

Other sections provide for publication of notices or creditors;
for the execution by the assignee of a bond and the filing of an
inventory in the county court; for the report of a list of all
creditors of the assignor; and for- exception by any person
interested to the claim or demand of any other creditor. The
sixth section provides"That at the first term of the said county court, after the expiration of the three
month, as aforesaid, should no exception be made to the claim of any creditor, or
if exceptions have been made, and the same have been adjudicated and settled by
the court, the said court shall order the assignee or assignees to make, from time
to time, fair and equal dividends (among the creditors) of the assets in his or their
hands, in proportion to their claims," etc.

The eighth section declares"That no assignment shall be declared fraudulent or void for want of any list or
inventory as provided in the first section."
13. Every provision in any assignment, hereafter made in this State, providing
for the payment of one debt or liability in preference to another, shall ILe void, and
all debts and liabilities within the provisions of the assignment shall be paid pro
rata from the assets thereof.

The main object of this legislation is manifest It is to
secure equality of right among the creditors of a debtor who
makes a voluntary assignment of his property. It annuls every
provision in any assignment, giving a preference of one creditor
over another. No creditor is to be excluded from participation in the proceeds of the assigned property because of the
failure of the debtor to make and file the required inventory of
his estate and the list of his creditors; nor, if such a list is filed,
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is any creditor to be denied his pro ratapart of such proceeds,
because his name is omitted, either by design or mistake upon
the part of the debtor. The difficulty with the courts has not
been in recognizing the beneficent objects of this legislation,
but in determining whether, in view of the special circumstances
attending their execution, particular instruments are to be
treated as part of an assignment, within the meaning of the
statute. The leading case upon this subject in the Supreme
Court of Illinois is Preston v. Spaudding (1887), I20 I11. 208.
In that case, the members of an insolvent firm, in anticipation
of bankruptcy, made, within a period of less than thirty days,
four conveyances of their individual estate to near relatives, and
various payments of money to other relatives, on alleged debts;
after these conveyances and payments, and with full knowledge
of impending failure, the members of the firm held a conference with their legal advisers, before the expiration of said
thirty days, respecting the measures to be adopted by them,
and the shape their failure was to assume. It was determined
that they should make a voluntary assignment, but that preference be given to certain creditors by executing to them what
are called "judgment notes." The assignment in form was
made, but on the same day, and before it was executed, the
creditors to whom the notes were given, caused judgment by
confession to be entered thereon, and immediately, and before
the deed of assignment was or could be filed, caused execution
to be issued ard levied, whereby they took to themselves the
great bulk of the debtor's estate. The trustee named in the
assignment having refused to attack the preferences thus
secured, a creditor brought suit in equity, upon the theory that
the giving of the judgment note and the making of the deed
of assignment were parts of one transaction, and consequently
the preferences attempted were illegal and void under the
statute. The Supreme Court of Illinois, considering the question whether the preferential judgments obtained in that case
were within the prohibitions of the Act of 18M, said"The statute is silent as to the form of the instrument or instruments by which
an insolvent debtor may effcct an assignment. * * * If then, these prefer-

ences are to be held to be within the ' provisions' of the assignment or ' comprehended within its general terms,' it must be because they fall within the intent
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and spirit of the act. It will be observed this act does not assume to interfere, in
the slightest degree, with the action of a debtor, while he retains the dominion of
his property. Notwithstanding this act, he may now, as heretofore, in good faith,
sell his property, mortgage or pledge it to secure a bonafide debt, or create a lien
upon it by operation of law, as by confessing a judgmeit in favor of a bonafide
creditor. But when he reaches the point where he is ready, and determines to
yield the dominion of his property, and makes an assignment for the benefit of his
creditors, under the statute, this act declares that the effect of such assignment
shall be the surrender and conveyance of all his estate, not exempt bylaw, to his
assignee, rendering void all preferences, and bringing about the distribution of his
whole estate equally among his bona~fide creditors; and we hold that it is within
the spirit and intent of the statute that, when the debtor has formed a determination to voluntarily dispose of his whole estate, and has entered upon that determination, it is immaterial into how many parts the performance or execution of his
determination may be broken, the law will regard all his acts having for their object and effect the disposition of his estate, as parts of a single transaction, and, on
the execution of the formal assignment, it will, under the statute, draw to it, and
the law will regard as embraced within its provisions, all prior acts of the debtor
having for their object and purpose the voluntary transfer or disposition of his estate to or for creditors; and, if any preferences are shown to have been made or
given by the debtorto one creditor over another in such disposition of his estate,
full effect will be given the assignment, and such preferences will, in a court of
equity, be declared void, and set aside as in fraud of the statute."

After setting out the details of the plan devised to secure
certain creditors a preference in advance of the filing of the
deed of assignment, the Court further said" It will be observed that all this was strictly in accordance with the forms of
law; but will any one deny that a most palpable fraud was in fact perpetrated
upon the appellee, Spaulding, by the debtors, or that the acts of the debto.s were
in fraud of the statute ? * * * This voluntary assignment act is in its character remedial, and must therefore be liberally construed, and no insolvent debtor
having in view the disposition of his estate, can be permitted to defeat its operation, by effecting unequal distribution of his estate by means of an assignment,
and any other shift or artifice under the forms of law; and, whatever obstacles
might be encountered in other courts of this State, a court of equity, when properly invoked, was bound to look through and beyond the form, and have regard to
the substance, and, having done so, to find and declare these preferential judgments void under the statute, and to set them aside."

See, also, Bank's Appeal (I868), 57 Pa. 193, 199; Winner
v. Hoyt (1886), 66 Wis. 227, 239; Wilks v. Walker (I884), 22
S. C. io8, III.
We agree with the Supreme Court of Illinois that this statute, being remedial in its character, must be liberally construed; that is, construed "largely and beneficially, so as to
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suppress the mischief and advance the remedy." That Court
said in Railroad Co- v. Dunn (1869), 52 Ill. 26o, 263: "The
rule in construing remedial statutes, though it may be in derogation of the common law, is, that everything is to be done in
advancement of the remedy that can be done consistently with
any fair construction that can be put upon it." See, also,
Johnesv.Johnes(I814), 3 Dow 15. If, then, we avoid overstrict construction, and regard substance rather than form; if
effect be given to this legislation, as against mere devices that
will defeat the object of its enactmenti-the several writings
executed by Alexander White, Jr., all about the same time, to
his mother, sisters, and brother, whereby, in contemplation of
his bankruptcy, and according to a plan previously formed, he
surrendered his entire estate for their benefit, to the exclusion
of all other creditors, must be deemed a single instrument, expressing the purposes of the parties in consummating one
transaction, and operating as an assignment or transfer under
which the appellee, Cotzhausen, may claim equality of right
with the creditors so preferred. It is true there was not here,
as in Preston v. Spaulding, a formal deed of assignment by the
debtor under the statute. But of what avail will the statute
be in securing equality among the creditors of a debtor, who,
being insolvent, has determined to yield the dominion of his
entire estate, and surrender it for the benefit of creditors, if
some of them can be preferred by the simple device of not
making a formal assignment, and permitting them, under the
cover or by means of conveyances, bills of sale, or written
transfers, to take his whole estate on account of their respective debts, to the exclusion of other creditors ? If Alexander
White, Jr., intending to surrcnder all his property for the benefit of his creditors, and to stop business, had excepted from
the conveyances, bill of sale, and transfers executed to his
mother, sisters, and brother, a relatively small amount of property, and had shortly thereafter made a general assignment
under the statute, it could not be doubted under the decision
in Preston v. Spaulding,and in view of the facts here disclosed,
that such conveyances, bill of sale, and transfers would have
been held void as giving forbidden preferences to particular
creditors; and his assignment would have been held, at the
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suit of other creditors, to embrace, not simply the property
owned by him when it was made, but all that he previously conveyed, sold, and transferred to his mother, sisters, and brother.
But can he, having the intention to quit business and surrender
his entire estate to creditors, be permitted to defeat any such
result by simply omitting to make a formal assignment, and
by including the whole of his property in conveyances, bills of
sale, and transfers to the particular creditors whom he desires
to prefer? Shall a failing debtor be allowed to employ indirect means to accomplish that which the law prohibits to be
done directly ? These questions must be answered in the
negative. They could not be answered otherwise without suggesting an easy mode by which the entire object of this legislation may be defeated.
We would not be understood as contravening the general
principle, so distinctly announced by the Supreme Court of
Illinois, that a debtor, even when financially embarrassed, may
in good faith compromise his liabilities, sell or transfer property in payment of debts, or mortgage or pledge it as security
for debts, or create a lien upon it by means even of a judgment
confessed in favor of his creditor: Preston v. Spaulding,
supra; Field v. Geohegan (1888), 125 Ill. 70. Such transactions often take place in the ordinary course of business,
when the debtor has no purpose, in the near future, of
discontinuing business, or of going into bankruptcy and surrendering control of all his property. A debtor is not bound
to succumb under temporary reverses in his affairs, and has
the right, acting in good faith, to use his property in any mode
he chooses, in order to avoid a general assignment for the
benefit of his creditors. We only mean by what has been said,
that when an insolvent debtor recognizes the fact that he can
no longer go on in business, and determines to yield the dominion of his entire estate, and in execution of that purpose,
or with an intent to evade the statute, transfers all, or substantially all, his property to a part of his creditors, in order to
provide for them in preference to other creditors, the instrument or instruments by which such transfers are made, and
that result is reached, whatever their form, will be held to operate as an assignment, the benefits of which may be claimed
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by any creditor not so preferred, who will take appropriate
steps in a court of equity to enforce the equality contemplated
by the statute. Such, we think, is the necessary result of the
decisions in the highest court of the State.
The views we have expressed find some support in adjudged
cases in the Eighth Circuit, where the courts have construed
the statute of Missouri [Rev. Stat. Ch. 5, §354, page 54, ed.
1879], providing that " every assignment of lands, tenements,
goods, chattels, effects, and crledits, made by a debtor to any
person in trust for his creditors, shall be for the benefit of all
the creditors of the assignor in proportion to their respective
claims." Referring to that statute, KREKEL, J., said, in Kellog
v. Richardson (1883), 19 Fed. Repr. 70, 72, following the previous case of AIartin v. Hausman (1882), 14 Id. I6o"A merchant may give a mortgage or a deed of trust in part or all of his property, to secure one or more of his creditorz, thus preferring them, but be cannot
convey the whole of his property to one or more creditors ani stop doing business.
Such turning over and virtually declaring insolvency brings the instrument or act
by which it is done within the assignment law of Missouri, which requires a distribution of the property of the failing debtor for the benefit of all the creditors in
proportion to their respective claims. Such is the declared policy of the law; it
places all creditors upon an equal footing."

.So, in Kerbs v. Ewing (1884), 22 Fed. Repr. 693, where Judge
referring to the Missouri statute, said-

MCCRARY,

"No matter what the form of the instrument, where a debtor, being insolvent,
conveys all his property to athird party, to pay one or more creditors, to the exclu
sion of others, such a conveyance w1l be construed to be an assignment for the
benefit of all the creditors ; the preference being in contravention of the assignment laws of this State."

Again, in Freund v. Yaegerinan (I884), 26 Fed. Repr. 812,
814, it was said by TREAT, J., that the conclusion reached by
Mr. Justice MILLER, and Judges McCRARY, KREKEL, and himself, was"That, under the statute of the State of Missouri, concerning voluntary assignments, when property was disposed of in entirety or substantially-that is, the entire property of the debtor, he being insolvent-it fell within the provisions of the
assignment law. The very purpose of the law was that no preference should be
given. No matter by what name the end is sought to be effected, it is in violation
of that statute. You may call it a mortgage, or you may make a confession of
judgment, or use any other contrivance, by whatever name known, if the purpose
is to dispose of an insolvent debtor's estate, whereby a preference is to be effected,
it is in violation of the statute."
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See, also, Perryv. Corby (1884), 2 1 Fed. Repr. 737; Clapp v.
Vittiman (1884), Id. 15 ; Clapp v. Nordmcyer (I885), 25 Id. 71.
If Alexander White, Jr., had made a formal assignment of
his entire property, in trust for the benefit, primarily or exclusively, of his mother, sisters, and brother, as creditors, its illegality would have been so apparent that other creditors would
have been allowed to participate in the proceeds of sale. By
the conveyances, bill of sale, confession of judgment, and
transfers, all made about the same time, and pursuant to an
understanding previously reached, he has effected precisely
the same result as would have been reached by a formal assignment to a trustee for the exclusive benefit of his mother,
brother, and sisters. The latter is forbidden by the letter of
the statute, and the former is equally forbidden by its spirit
Surely, the mere name of the particular instruments by which
the illegal result is reached ought not to be permitted to stand
in the way of giving the relief contemplated by the statute.
Courts of equity are not to be misled by mere devices, nor
baffled by mere forms.
It remains only to consider the effect of these views upon
Ve have already seen that the Circuit
the decree below.
Court proceeded upon the ground that the conveyances, bill
of sale, confession of judgment, and transfers by Alexander
White, Jr., were made without adequate consideration, and
with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud the appellee. Upon
these grounds, it gave him a prior right in the distribution of
the property. We are not able to assent to this determination
of the rights of the parties, for the mother, sisters and brother
of Alexander White, Jr., were his creditors, and, so far as the
record discloses, they only sought to obtain a preference over
other creditors. But their attempt to obtain such illegal preference ought not to have the effect of depriving them of their
interest, under the statute, in the proceeds of the property in
question, or justify a decree giving a prior right to the appellee. It was not intended, by the statute, to give priority of
right to the creditors who are not preferred. All that the ap
pellee can claim, is to participate in such proceeds upon terms
of equality with other creditors.
It results that the decree below is erroneous, so far as it
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directs the property, rights and interests therein described to
be sold in satisfaction, primarily, of the sums found by the
decree to be due from Alexander White, Jr., to the appellee.
The case should go to a master to ascertain the amount of all
the debts owing by Alexander White, Jr., at the date of said
conveyances, bill of sale and transfers. In respect to the
amounts due from him to his mother, sisters, and brother,
respectively, it is not necessary, at this time, to express any
opinion, further than that the accounting in the Probate Court
between them is not conclusive against the appellee. It will
be for the Court below to determine, under all evidence, what
amounts are justly due from Alexander White, Jr., to his
mother, sisters and brother, taking into consideration all the
circumstances attending his management of the property,
formerly owned by his father, whether real or personal.
To the extent we have indicated, the decree is reversed, each
side paying one-half the costs in this Court; and the cause is
remanded, with a direction for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
The Chief Justice did not sit in this case, or participate in
its decision.
The principal case establishes, that
three things are forbidden to a man who
is unable to go on in business: he may
not convey, nor mortgage, nor confess
judgment. If he contemplate continuance in business, then he may do any
or all of these things, so long as he does
not thereby prevent himself from, in fact,
continuing his business.
The general principles upon which
the judgment of the principal case was
founded, were well declared by AGNEW,
J., in Miner's Nat'lBank Aptp. (1868),
57 Pa. 193, 199: "So long as men
manage their own affairs, and preserve
the control of their property, it has been
the policy of our laws to suffer them to
deal with their estates, in the absence of
fraud, as they find most conducive to
their interests. * * * * This results,
in the absence of bankrupt laws, from

that freedom of individual action which
the genius of our institutions secures
and concedes, as a measure of liberty
belonging to the citizen, and necessary
to the development of the greatest good
of society."
"It supposes that while the debtor
preserves control of his affairs in his
own hands, the vigilance of creditors
will be competent to protect their interests and to avert any injury."
"1When a man can no longer go on
in business, and what he has must pass
into the liquidation of his debts, fairness
requires that he should not dictate the
course his property shall take. To permit it, is to afford an opportunity for the
enemies of virtue to obtain preference,
and to create prejudicial hostility."
And the contrary expressions in
Blakey's App.. (1848), 7 Pa. 449, and
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lea's App,. (W 4S), 9 Id. 504, were held
not to prevail ov, r the true in'ent of the
(Pa.) Voluntary Assignment Act. But,
unfortunately, th':se ca.ses have since
been ebtablihed as tire law of Pennsylvania.
"°Ihe question presented is not
whether an insolvent debtor may secure
a creditor. hut whether insolvent debtors
may, by way of chattel rnrrtgages, at.d
assignments to certain creditors, as in
the case before us, assign and tramfer
their entire property for the benefit of
such cred:tors, with the in:ent of having
one of such creditors, for himself and
as agent and trustee for the others, take
immediate possession, and convert the
same into money, and then to divide the
saeprora!a among such favored creditors:"

CASSODAY, J., IVizner v. 11,t

(1886), 66 Wis. 227, 239.
The contrary view to that taken in
the principal case is well e\pressed l.y
TAYLOR, J.,dissenting in the la-t mentioned case: "Under our statute, no
creditor of an insolvent debtor has any
preference over another, nor has he any
right to demand that the debtor shall
not prefer his other creditors to him,
unless he voluntarily chooses to make
an assignment for the benefit of all his
creditors. The creditor has no power
to compel a voluntary assignment, or an
equal ditribution of the assets of his
debtor, in any case. ** **
If the
writings in this case are an assignment
in substance, it is so simply because the
debtor has given all his assets to the
preferred creditors. * * * * And why
should not the same result follow, if the
del tor suffers an execution upon a judgment obtained by one creditor, in the
ordinary course of proceeding, of sufficient amount to sweep away all the
assets to be levied ?" ( Winner v. Hr,yt
(1886), 66 Wis. 248, 251.)
Such statutes are to be liberally construed: see the principal case and the
Illinois decisions there cited. And, as

a c(,nseluence, all courts recognize that
there is no test of form. A conflict of
decisions arises, however, on the lines
of the two v:ews of a debtor's right to
prefer in payment, or the means of obtaning payment, without actual fraud.
The various decisions may be classified by States, and they in one of three
divisions: (i) Where all preference is
forl,idden ; (2) where preferences in the
assignment are forbidden; and (3)
where preferences are allowed.
Only the first of these three classes
can be considered here.
The Alabama Code of 1887 provides,
i 1737,page 419 (Code ofIS76, 2126):
" Every general assignment made by a.
debtor, I y Ahich a preference or priority
of payment is given to one or more
creditors, over the remaining creditors
of the grantor, shall be and inure to the
benefit of all the creditors of the grantor
equally; but this section shall not apply
to cr embrace mortgages given to secure
a debt contracted contemporaneously
with the execution of the mortgage, and.
for the security of which the mortgage
was given."

The last clause was added, by Act of*
February 23, 1883 (Laws, p. 189), to
obviate the construction made in Shirley
v. Teal(iSSo), 67 Ala. 449, and Danner
v. Brewer (18S1), 69 Id. 191 ; SOMERVILLE, J., Varten v. MJatthews (1885),
8o Id. 43o .
Prior to the Code of 1876, preferences
were permitted, and in forbidding such
distinctions between creditors, the courts
of that State hold that the application of
this statute does not depend upon form
or name, but a substantial transfer of all
the property of the debtor, sul ject to the
payment of his debts: Danncr& Co.
v. Brewer 6- Co. (t88I), 59 Ala. 191,
199; Ordway v. While (1885), 8o Id.
245; Collier v. Wood, S. Ct. July 19,
z888. In these cases, the form of instrument adopted was that of a mortgage. But several papers might have
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'been used as unsuccessfully: Danner
v. Brewer, supra, 200, citing 1It V.
Bancroft (I857), 30 Id. 193.
The Arizona Rev. Stat., ed. 1887,
Title iii. (act approved March io, 1887),
provide-" 22. That every assignment,
made by an insolvent debtor, or in contemplation of insolvency, for the benefit
-ofhis creditors, shall provide, except as
herein otherwise provided, for a distribution of all his real and personal estate
other than that which is, by law, exempt
fiom execution, among all his creditors,
in proportion to their respective claims,
and l.owever made, cr expressed, shall
have the effect aforesaid, and shall be
construed to pass all such estate, whether
specified therein or not, and every assignment shall be proved or acknowledged and cee'ified andrecorded in the
same manner as is provided by law in
conveyances of real estate or other
property."
"24. Any debtor, desiring so to do,
may make an assignment for the benefit
of such of his creditors only, as will
consent to accept their proportional
share of his estate and discharge him
from their respective claims, and, in
such case, the benefits of the assignment
shall be limited and restricted to the
-creditors consenting thereto; the debtor
shall thereupon be and stand discharged
from all further liability to such consenting creditors, on account of their
respective claims, and, when paid, they
shall execute and deliver to the assignee,
for the debtor, a release therefrom."
o
"3 . All property conveyed or transferred by the assignor, previous to and
in contemplation of the assignment, with
the intent or design to defeat, delay or
defraud creditors, or to give preference
to one creditor over another, shall pass
to the assignee, by the assignment, notwithstanding such transfer; and the assignee, or in case of his neglect or
refusal, any creditor or creditors, may,
in his name, upon securing such as-
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signee against cost or liability, sue for,
recover, collect and cause the same to
be applied for the benefit of creditors, as
other property, belonging to the debtor's
estate in the hands of the assignee; but
if it shall appear that the purchaser of
any such property bought the same of
the assignor, in good faith, and for a
valuable consideration, and without
reason to believe that the debtor was
conveying or transferring the same, wi.h
the intent or design, as aforesaid, such
lpurclaser!:hall be held to have acquired,
as against the assignee, and creditors
aforesaid, a good and valid title to such
property.""
"32. If any assignor shall secrete, or
conceal, from his assignee, any portion
of his property Lelonging to his estate,
other than that which is exempt from
execution, or shall, previous to, and in
contemplation of, the assignment, transfer any property, with the intent or design to defraud his creditors, such
assignor shall be adjudged guilty of a
felony."
"38. Every mortgage, deed of trust,
or other form of lien attempted to be
given by the owner of any stock of
goods, wares or merchandise, daily exposed to sale, in parcels, in the rtgular
course of business of such merchandise,
and contemplating a continuance of
possession of said goods and control of
said business, by sale c f said goods by
said owner, shall be deemed fraudulent
and void."
"39. Any attempted preference, in
the assignment, of one creditor, or creditors, of such assignor, shall be deemed
fraudulent and without effect."
The Illinois statutes are quoted in the
opinion of the principal case, and, in
framework and detail, constitute a general Insolvent Law: Hanchettv.Waterbuy (1885), 115 IIl. 220, 227 (per
MULKEY, J.).

They do not prescribe

any form of assignment, and it is immaterial whether the preferences are men-
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tioned or not; it is also immaterial how
many instruments are used in the attempt to prefer: Preston v. S.paulding
(xS8 7 ), 120 Ill.
208, 28, where the
Court said that "the principles here
announced find support in the following
authorities: Berty v. Cutt (1856), 42
Me. 445 ; _1olt
v. Bancroft (1857), 30
Ala. 193; A'ello& v. Root (1885), U. S.
Circ. Ct. W. Dist. Mich., 23 Fed. Repr.
525; * * * see, also, Burroughs v.
Lehndorff (185 9 ), 8 Iowa 96; Fan Patten v. .lllrk's(1879),52Id. 518; Perry
v. Holden (1839), 22Pick. (Mass.) 269 ;
Livermore v. Alcgair (1881), 34 N. J.
Eq. 478; Han v. Sa/mon (1884), U.
S. Circ. Ct., Dist. Ore., 2o Fed. Repr.
8oI ; .Doggett v. II

rinan (IS8

3

), U. S.

Circ. Ct., Dist. Ore., 5 McCrary 269;
U. S. v. Griswold (1881), U. S. Circ.
Ct., Dist. Ore., 8 Fed. Repr. 496."
The importance of the principal case
and of the Illinois decisions cannot be
appreciated, if attention be not given to
Fieldv. Geohgan, cited near the close
of the opinion in the principal case. It
establishes that the failing debtor's preference must not be in contemplation of
discontinuing business: Schroeder v.
Walsh (1887), 120 Ill. 403; Hide &Leather Nat'l Bk. v. Rehm, S. Ct. Ill.,
November 15, I888.
The Iowa statutes provide (Rev.
Code, ed. 1888, ch. 7,P. 777)-" 22115.
No general assignment of property by
an insolvent, or in contemplation of insolvency, for the benefit of creditors,
shall be valid, unless it be made for the
benefit of all his creditors, in proportion to the amount of their respective
claims."
" 2116. In the case of an assignment of property for the benefit of all
the creditors of the assignor, the assent
of the creditors shall be presumed."
. Under this statute, the courts of Iowa
do not go to the extent of the decision
in the principal case; for, in Van Patien &fffarks v. Barr(1879), 52 Iowa
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the court distinguished their

resolution (that a chattel mortgage and
an assignment for the benefit of creditors, executed on the same day, and admitted in the pleadings to be one transaction, were void), fiom a prior decision, in Lampqson 6- Powers v. Arnold
(x865), 19 Iowa 479, where the insolvent, simultaneously with the execution
of the assignment, paid certain debts
by money, by transfer of promissory
notes, and by conveyance of land.
"The insolvent, as long as he retains
the fits disponendi of his property, may
appropriate it to the payment of his
debts, and may prefer creditors. He
may use all his property this way, or he
may use a part and make a general assignment of the remainder. The payment and. assignment cannot obviously
be regarded as one transaction, and each
will be valid. * * * But if, with the
intention of disposing of all his property for the benefit of his creditors, he
mortgages a part and assigns the remainder, these constitute one transaction" : BECK, C. J., Van Patten &'
Aiarks v. Burr (1879), 52 Iowa 523.
That is, a partial assignment is still
valid: Loomisv. Stewart, S. Ct. October
6, 1888; Aloore v. Church (1886), 70
Iowa 208, 211; Garrettv. Burlington.

Plow Co. (1886), Id. 697, 703; Bowles
v. Creighton (1887), 73 Id. 199, 204,
citing Aulman v. Aulman (1887), 71
Id. 124, and the second decision (upon
the evidence), in Van Patten v. Burr
(188o), 55 Id. 224. So, also, Van Patten v. ThomPson (887), 73 Id. o3 ;
Farwellv. Afaxwell (888), U. S. Circ.
Ct. S. Dist. Iowa, 34 Fed. Repr. 727;
Burrows v. Lehndorff (1859), 8 Iowa.
96.
Of course, in the absence of an intention to assign, a mortgage may be
made; subject to attack for hindering
creditors: Kohn Bros. v. Clement,
(1882), 58 Iowa 589; Aulman v. Aulman, supra. An interval of even one-
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hour, in the absence of contradictory
proof, will not be too short to form an
intention to assign : Gage v. Parry
(1886), 69 Iowa 605, 61o; Farwellv.
Maxwell, suipra.
The Kentucky General Statutes, (ed.
1887, ch.44, art. 2,page 671), provide" x. Every sale, mortgage, or assignment, made by debtors, and every judgment suffered by any defendant, or any
act or device, done or resorted to by a
debtor, in contemplation of insolvency,
and with the design to prefer one or
more creditors, to the exclusion, in
whole, or in part, of others, shall operate as an assignment and transfer of all
the property and effects of such debtor,
and shall inure to the benefit of all his
creditors (except as hereinafter provided), in proportion to the amount of
their respective demands, including
those which are future and contingent;
but nothing in this article shall vitiate
or affect any mortgage, made in good
faith, to secure any debt or liability,
created simultaneously with such mortgage, if the same be lodged for record within thirty days after its execution."
as are
"- 2. All such transfers
herein declared to inure to the benefit
of creditors generally, shall be subject
to the control of courts of equity, upon
the petition of any person interested,
filed within six months after the mortgage, or transfer, is legally lodged for
record, or the delivery of the property
or effects transferred."
In the construction of this statute,
the intention of the debtor is the essential feature of each case. Payment by
an insolvent will create a presumption
of a design to prefer, but this presump.
tion is not absolute: "it will not and
ought not to prevail if the circumstances of the transaction show that no
preference was intended": HOLT, J.,
Grimes v. Grimes, Ct. App., January 7,
I888, citing Hamnplon v. Mlorris (1859),
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2 Mete. (Ky.) 336, and Thompson v.
Heffner's Exrs. (1875), 11 Bush. (Ky.)
353"While it is true, that neither the
letter nor the spirit of the statute forbids a debtor from creating a'debt in
good faith, though he be in failing circumstances, and secure the debt by
giving a mortgage on his property, simultaneously with the creation of the
debt, which would hold good as against
his creditors, yet, if a debtor, knowing
that he is insolvent, and, in order to
give a particular creditor a preference
over other creditors, gives him a mortgage to secure a debt, or liability, already created, together with a liability
simultaneously created, as was done in
this case, and the creditor, knowing the
true state of the case, as in this case,
aids the arrangement, then he is not a
mortgagee in good faith, to secure a
debt, or liability, simultaneously created
with the execution of the mortgage:
BENNETT, J., McCann v. Hid (887),
85 Ky. 574, 581. And so, when the
purchasers of a lot of timber had advanced the purchase money to enable
the insolvent to make delivery, by purchasing, felling and rafting the lumber,
and the buyers were bona fde purchasers, such delivery was not a preference : Vincent v. AcAlpin, Court
of Appeals, June 16 and Sept. 13,
1888, citing Va.per v. Yager (i881),
79 Ky.

241;

Southworth v.

Casey

(1880), 78 Id. 395, and distinguishing
Fuugua v. Ferrell (1882), 8o Id. 69.
Likewise, a small payment, in the ordinary course of business, and without
intent to prefer, would not be avoided
as a preference, by an assignment a few
dayslater: 7albott'sAssignee v. Ewalt,
Ct. App., March 1, I888.
Maine and Maryland do not have a
statutory system of assignments for the
benefit of creditors, but only an Insolvent Law: Rev. Stat. Maine, ed. 1884,
Title vi., chap. 70, page 572 sqq.-Code
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of Maryland, ed. 1888, Art. 47 ; P. L.
G. Art. 48.
Louisiana provides only for a state of
insolvency, and does not recognize assignments: Rev. Civil Code, Title iv,
chap. 3, section 7, 2 (ed. 1888, p. 371
sqq.), and Rev. Stat. Laws, 1781 sqq.
(ed. 1876, p. 469 sqq).
Massachusetts has an insolvent system (Pub. Stat. ed. 1882, chap. 157,
pages 878, 892, sqq.), but has recently
recognized a voluntary assignment, providing for distribution in substantial
conformity with the insolvent law: Acts
of 1887, ch. 340, p. 955. Prior to this
latter statute, an assignment was repeatedly held to be valid only as against assenting creditors: Faulknerv.Iryman
(1886), 142 Ma-s. 53- "This, for the
reason that there was no adequate considarati.on unless with the assent of the
creditors, without which no insolvent
debtor should be allowed so to dispose
of'his property, as to pace it beyond
their reach": DEVENS, J., Id. 5 1The New York Rcvised Statutes provide, as respects moneyed corporations
(ed. 1888, p. 1555, ch. xviii, Title 2A,
chap. 8),--" 1S7. No such conveyance, assignment or transfer, nor any
payment made, judgment suffered, lien
created, or security given by my such
corporation, when insolvent, or in contemplation of insolvency, with the intent of giving a preference to any particular creditor over other creditors of
the c:mpany, shall be valid in law;
and every person receiving, by means
of any such conveyance, assignment,
transfer, lien, security or payment, any
of the effects of the corporation, shall be
hound to account therefore to its creditors or stockholders, or their trustees,
as the case shall require; and whenever any incorporated company shall
have refused the payment of any of its
notes, or other evidences of debt, in
specie or lawful money of the United
States, it shall not I.e lawful for such

company, or any of its officers, to assign or transfer any of the property or
choses in action of such company, to
any officer or stockholder of such compa'y, directly or indirectly, for the payment of any debt; and every such
transfer and assignment to such officer
or stockholder, shall he utterly void."
Under this statute, the inquiry is confined to the two poin-s of an actual (or
contemplated) insolvency and a transfer
of property: BARKER, J. King.ley v.
First Aat. B'k (1884), 31 Hun. 335.
So, also, limited partnerships are restrained ty Rev. Stat., ed. 1888, page
2495, Title I, chap. iv, part II), providing-" 20. Every sale, assignment,
or transfer of any of the property or
effects of such partnership, made by
such partnerohip when insolvent, or in
contemp'ation of insolvency, or after,
or in con'emplation, of the insolvency
of any partner, with the intent of giving
a preference to any creditor of such
partnership, or insolvent partner, over
other creditors of such partnership;
and ev, ry judgment confessed, lien
created, or securi:y given, by such partnership, under the like circumstances,
and with the like intent, shall be void,
as against the creditors of such partnership."
" 21. Every such sale, assignment,
or transfer of any of the property or
effects of a general or special partner,
made by suh general or special partner, when in.olvent, or in contemplation of insolvency, or after or in contemplation of the insolvency of the
partnership, with the intent of giving
any creditor of his own, or of the partncrship, a preference over creditors of
the paitnership; and every judtment
confessed, lien created, or security
given, by any such partner, under the
like circumstances, and with the like
intent, shall be void, as against the
creditors of the partnership."
Under this statute, if an assignment is
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made with preferences, and afterwards
another assignment without, the latter
will be valid against subsequent attachments: Schwar/z v. Sauter, Ct. App.,
Dec. 7, 1886.
It is uncertain whether this last section goes so far as to .revent a special
partner from administering his individu4tl pioperty, for the benefit of his individual crcditors: ANDREWS, J., Geoire
v. Grant(1S84), 97 N. Y. 268; but it
does :ot prevent a borrowing on mortgage, for the payment of individual
debts. The mortgage does not create a
preference, in such a case, and would
only be affected by collusion between
the parties, to defeat the statute : Id.
270.
Otherwise, an individual debtor, or
a general partnership, about to stop
business on account of insolvency, "has
a legal right to transfer all of his property to one or more creditors, provided
he does so in good faith, for its fair
value, and with an honest intent to pay
his debts" : RUGER, C. J., Willia;;s v.
Whedon (iM8S), 1o9 N. Y. 337, where
a surviving partner was allowed to assign with preferences. So in Beste v.
Burger (1888), iio Id. 644.
The Revised Statutes of New York
(ch. v., Title I. A., ed. z888, page
2542), provide in such case, that-" In
all general assignments of the estates
of debtors, for the benefit of creditors,
hereafter made, any preference created
therein (other than for wages or salaries
of employees, ui der chapter 328 of the
laws of 1884, and chapter 283 of the
laws of 1886), shall not be valid, except
to the amount of one-third in value of
the assigned estate left, after deducting
such wages or salaries, and the costs and
expenses of executing such trust; and
should said one-third of the assets of
the assignor or assignors be insufficient
to pay, in full, the preferred claims, to
which, under the provisions of this section, the same are applicable, then said
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assets shall be applied to the payment
of the same, pro ra!a, to the amount of
[Added
each said preferred claims"
by chap. 503, Laws I8S7].
It has been thought that the doctrine
of the principal case is also the law of
New York, and S,e/zer v. Smi.I, 22
Abb. N. C. 319; Rsse,- v. Coa, Id.
312; Third Arat'lBank v. Clark, Id.
312n; Sfpelman v. Jqf#ey, Id. 315, and
A essellv. Di'ucker,all decided in iSS9 ,
are cited. But Socetser v. Smith has
been reversed by the General Term of
the Supreme Court (51 Ilun. 642),
without any opinion, and the matter
must remain in doubt, until a sufficient
case reaches the Court of Appeals.
In the meantime, it may be recollected that an absolute bill of sae may
be shown to amount, in law, to an assignment for the Lenefit of creditors:
Brgton v. Loreziz (1871),45 N. Y. 51;
Brown v. Guthrie (iSSS), IIO Id. 435,
441. This possibility required the Court,
in the latter of the two cases just cited,
to define "the material and essential
characteristic of a general assignment"
to Le "the presence of a trust. The
assignee buys nothing anl pays nothing,
but takes the title for the performance
of trust duties." In this case, a debtor
was al'owed to mortgage a part of his
property for $2400; part of whilh sum
was a debt due to the mortgagee; another part was a sum of money then
loaned to the debtor; and the balance
was to be paid by the mortgagee to
certain named credi:ors of the debtor,
so that the agreement did not leave to
"the debtor," the right to dictate, after
the transaction, what creditors should
The mortgagee "became
be paid.
bound to pay them absolutely, out of his
own means, and whether his security
proved ample or insufficient. He held
no part of the property in trust for the
debtor, but solely as mortga:;ee, entitled
to its proceeds till his debt was paid,
and then bound to restore any surplus
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realized, to the mortgagor, or those
claiming under him. Such provision
never hinders creditors, for they may
pay the mortgage and take the property,
or fasten on the surplus :" FINCH, J.,
Brown v. Guthrie (1888), izo N. Y.
442.

The last cited case is worthy of note,
still further, because the opinion expressly affirms Brackett v. Harvaey
(1883), 91 N. Y. 214, where the mortgagor was allowed to remain in possession and sell the mortgaged goods : the
proceeds were applied to the reduction
of the mortgage debt, and this removed
any question of shielding the debtor.
The decision was expressly put upon
the doctrine of Robinson v. Elliott
(1874), 22 Wall. (89 U. S.) 513, 523,
and in affirmance of Fordv. Williams
(1862), 24 N. Y. 359; Conkling v.
Shelly (1863), 28 Id. 36o; Miller v.
Lockwood (1865), 32 Id. 293; Frostv.
Warren (1870)), 42 Id. 204; Southard
v. Benner (1878), 72 Id. 424-

Hence, in Fuller Electrical Co. v.
Lewis (decided March 2, x886, mem.
in ioi N. Y. 674, and reported in full
in 5 North East. Repr. 437, and 2 Cent.
Repr. 481), DANFORTH, J., said: "It
is entirely well settled that a debtor may
pay one creditor in preference to another,
and, unless there is an intent, at the
same time, to hinder, delay, or defraud
other creditors, the one so favored may
retain the fruits of that preference
against their claims."
Further note should be made that an
assignment is allowed when it conveys
a part only of the assignor's property,
for the benefit of selected creditors:
.napp v. McGowan (1884), 96 N. Y.
75, 85; though an insolvent must not
thereby leave his unsecured creditors
unprovided for, for no one, not even a
solvent debtor, can so assign his property, with a provision for the return of
the surplus to himelf (which is the
substance of an as.ignment), as to leave

no provision for the payment of all hisdebts: Id. 85.
Under these- statutes, the courts of'
New York enquire also whether the
assignment is made for -a fraudulent
purpose ; "the provision of law,
[Rev. Stat. ed. 1888, Title 3, chap. vii,
page 2592], that every conveyance
or assignment, made with intent to.
hinder, delay or defraud creditors, is
void, is still in full force and operation,
notwithstanding the act of 1858, and
the various acts relating to voluntary
assignments for the benefit of creditors": EARLE, J.,Loos v. Wilkinsotr
(1888), 1io N. Y. 209. So, TalcoltT.
Hess (1886), 4 N. Y. St. Rep. 62;
Nat'! ParkB'k v. Whitmore (1887),
io4 N. Y. 297.
The Ohio Revised Statutes (ed. 1884,
pp. 1332-4), provide-"

6343. All

assignments in trust, to a trustee or
trustees, made in contemplation of insolvency, with the intent to prefer oneor more creditors, shall inure to the
equal benefit of all creditors, in proportion to the amount of their respective
claims, and the trusts arising under thesame shall be administered in conformity with the provisions of this
chapter."
" 6344. All transfers, conveyances,
or assignments, made by a debtor or
procured by him to be made, with intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, shall be declared void, at the suitof any creditor; * * * ."

" 3156. Every sale, assignment, or
transfer of any of the property or effects
of the [limited] partnership, made by it
when insolvent, or in contemplation of
insolvency, or after, or in contemplation
of the insolvency of a partner, with the
intent of giving a preference to a creditor of the partnership or insolvent partner, over other creditors of the partnership, and every judgment confessed,
lien created, or security given by the
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partnership, under like circumstances,
and with the like intent, shall be void
as against the creditors of the partnership."
The Supreme Court has very recently
decided the case of Rouse, .1rustee, v.
Yhe Merchant's National Bank, June
18, 1889, holding that a corporation for
profit, organized under the laws of this
State, cannot, after it has become insolvent and ceased to prosecute the objects
for which it was incorporated, create
preference among its creditors, by giving mortgages to secure antecedent
debts. The preference falls when followed by an assignment, unless some
other consideration be given. This is
in accordance with a decision of JAcKSON, J. in the U. S. Circ. Ct., N. Dist.
Ohio (Iron City National Bank v.
Fals, 1886,), which went upon the
ground that the assets of an insolvent
corporation were a trust fund, for the
creditors.
Whether an individual debtor or a
partnership, might give preferences before executing an assignment, or without
so doing, is uncertain, and a decL-ion in
some pending case is thought likely.
In the meantime, it may be noted that
a mortgage, to secure, a bonafide indebtedness to his wife, maybe executed
by an insolvent to a trustee: Hilesman
v. Donnel (1883), 40 Ohio 287. The
mortgagee, being a trustee in this case,
did not convert the mortgage into an
assignment, solely because the wife
could not, at law, be made the mortgagee,
and, in equity, would require judicial
aid. The case does proceed upon the
ground that a mortgage may be made
to any bonafide creditor, but does not
touch the point of the amount of propperty mortgaged. A year later (1884),
a mortgage valid against the mortgagor,
but not against his creditors, was held
not to be made a preferred lien, by expressly excepting it from the operation
of the assignment subsequently made:
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Blandy v. Benedict (1884), 42 Ohio
295,298. The intention of the assignor
was disregarded. Earlie- still, while
deciding that an assignment did not
hinder, delay or defraud creditors, although it did prevent one creditor from
obtaining preference by judgment, or
oth~r adverse process, BARTLEY, J.,
expressed the very principle upon which
the Supreme Court of the United States
proceeded, in the principal case: "When
a man finds himself in failing circumstances, and unable to pay all his debts,
he can do no act morejust andequitable,

[sic] than to surrender and assign his
property, in trust, for the benefit'of all
his creditors:" Io.ffzan et al.v. Mackall et al. (1855), 5 Ohio 124, 133.
It is to be hoped that the Supreme
Court will apply this honest principle to
all cases of attempted preferences, and.
not stop at corporations.
Texas provides, Rev. Civil Code,
x888, page 65,-" ART. 65 i., All property conveyed or transferred by the assignor, previous to and in contemplation
of the assignment, with the intent or
design to defeat, delay or defraud creditors, or to give preference to one creditor over another, shall pass to the
assignee by the assignment, notwithstanding such transfer; and the assignee,
or in case of his neglect or refusal, any
creditor or creditors may in his name,
upon securingsdch assignee against cost
or liability, sue for, recover, collect and
cause the same to be applied for the
benefit of creditors as other property
belonging to the debtor's estate in the
hands of the assignee; but if it shall
appear in such action, that the purchaser of any such property bought the
same of the assignor in good faith, and
for a valuable consideration, and withoutanyreasonto believe that the debtor
was conveying or transferring the same,
with the intent or design aforesaid, such
purchaser shall be held to have acquired, as againstthe assignee and cred.
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itors aforesaid, a good and valid title to
such property."
Under this statute, a mortgage is
held to be valid when executed by
an insolvent, who intended to make
a voluntary assignment thereafter, if
he could not effect a compromise
with his other creditors: the words
"bought" and "purchaser" receive an
enlarged legal sense, and the mortgagee or vendee in good faith acquire a
good title to the property: Simmons
Ikardwtre Co. v. Aaufmzan, S. Ct.
April 24, 888. And, in case of a
mortga_e, the value of the property is
immaterial; the mortgages only have a
lien and the excess is not placed beyond the reach of creditors: I. These
cases confirm the earlier decisions of
Jackson v. Z1arby (1886), 65 Texas
710. 715 (S. C. z888, 70 Id. 410);
Baldw,7n v. Peet (1859), 22 Id. 708,
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717, 718; Watterman v. Silberberg(1886), 67 Id. zoo; Scott v. McDaniel
(1887), Id. 35.
Payment in property may be made by
an insolvent, but the creditor must not
receive more property than enough to
pay himself, and must not intend to do
more than collect his debt: Opp,7theimer v. Zalfle Bro. (1887), 68 Texas
409, 412; Smith v. Whi/ed(i886),
67 Id. 124; Elwardsv.Di,kson (1886),
66 Id. 613. This was attempted in the
principal case and the Texas case
should be considered in the light of the
last clause of the Texas statute.
Washington Territory has an insolvent law, which concludes (Code, ed.
z881, p. 349): " 2052. No assignment
of any insolvent debtor, otherwise than
is provided in tl.is chapter, shall be
legal, or binding upon creditors."
JOHN B. UHLL.

